Eugene L. Perry v. Kent and Carol McLaughlin : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Eugene L. Perry v. Kent and Carol McLaughlin :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker; Charles M. Bennett; Attorney for Appellant.
E. H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Eugene L. Perry v. Kent and Carol McLaughlin, No. 880084.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1973
w i Mr* W U 8 T OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMi 
K F U 
60 
JMO 
DOCKfe 
ENT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INT^gjRC™ 
ESTATE OF 
DIANE MCLAUGHLIN, 
Deceased, 
EUGENE PERRY, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, 
Appellant 
vs. 
KENT & CAROL McLAUGHLIN 
Respondents 
88-0084-/; 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 860436 
District Court Case No. 
P 85-893 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)534-1148 
Attorney for Respondents 
Kent and Carol McLaughlin 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
Suite 800, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
(801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Eugene L. Perry, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
• ! L - t l s / 
MAR 31987 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
DIANE MCLAUGHLIN, 
Deceased, 
EUGENE PERRY, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, 
Appellant 
vs. 
KENT & CAROL McLAUGHLIN 
Respondents 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 860436 
District Court Case No. 
P 85-893 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)534-1148 
Attorney for Respondents 
Kent and Carol McLaughlin 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
Suite 800, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
(801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Eugene L. Perry, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ISSUE ON APPEAL.. 1. 
Did the Court have jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter at 
the time of its Order, December 3, 1985/ 1 
(a) The scope and jurisdiction of the District Court is set forth in Title 
71-1-302 entitled SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 1 
(b) The personal Representative was bound by the order of the 
Court by virtue of 75-1-403 Utah Code Ann 1 
(c) Kent McLaughlin is an interested person in that he was a creditor 
of the estate within the meaning of 75-1-201 Utah Code Ann 1 
(d) The Order of the Court was based on the Petition of the Personal 
representative and not upon that of Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin 1 
(e) The Personal Representative elected to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the Court by filing his petition requesting approval of the sale of the 
home and the furnishings 2 
(f) The Probate Code mandates that it shall be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
Kent McLaughlin is the natural father and guardian of Shaun 
McLaughlin (age 14) and Dustin McLaughlin (age 10) 2 
Kent McLaughlin agreed to Mr. Perry acting as Personal 
Representative of the estate 3 
Promises were made to Shaun and Dustin by Mr. Perry to the effect 
that Shaun and Dustin could keep their mother's furniture and 
personal property, which would be stored for them 3. 
On or about October 15, 1985, the Personal Representative 
petitioned the Court for an approval of the sale of the home, and in a 
separate package, the sale of the furniture 4 
On November 6, 1985, a hearing on Mr. Perry's Petition was held 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 4 
Mr. Perry, through Mr. Bennett, then prepared and submitted an 
Order which was signed by the Court on December 3, 1985 5 
The McLaughlins made numerous attempts to obtain possession of 
the furniture which they had purchased on or about November 27, 
1985 6 
The Court denied Mr. Perry's Rule 60(b) Petition and the Amended 
Petition 6 
POINT ONE 7 
The Court's Order of December 3, 1985 was a proper exercise of its jurisdictional authority under §75-1-302 and §75-3-105 Utah Code 
Ann 7 
A. The Sale of the Home and Furniture to the Arnauds was a 
Violation of a Lawful Order of the Court and a Breach of Mr. Perry's 
duty to protect the interests of the estate and its creditors 8 
C. The Court's Order, Given Pursuant to Good Jurisdiction,was not 
Deviated From in Good Faith 9 
SUMMARY OF POINT ONE 9 POINT TWO 10 
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i i i 
Kent McLaughlin was an interested party within the scope and 
meaning of §75-1-201(20) Utah Code Ann 
A. Kent McLaughlin's equity interest in the home qualifies him as an 
interested party 
The Alleged Oral Transfer of Kent McLaughlin's Equity Interest 
Stated in Appellant's Brief Does Not Affect His Standing as an 
Interested Person 
The Court is Empowered to Determine the Meaning of "Interested 
Person" According to its Discretionary Assessment of the Nature of 
the Proceedings and the Matters Involved ; 
The Court made a correct use of its discretion in determining that the 
interests of Kent McLaughlin were sufficient to qulify him as an 
interested person empowered to bid on the sale of the home and 
furniture 
B. Kent McLaughlin is the natural father of his minor children, 
Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin who are the sole heirs at law of the 
Decedent's estate, and his appearance at the November 6, 1985 
hearing was to represent the interests of his minor wards 
1- The death of one parent, survived by the other parent, qualifies the 
surviving parent as the natural guardian of surviving minor children... 
SUMMARY OF POINT TWO...... 
CONCLUSIONS 
COMMENT ON APPELLANT'S CASE AUTHORITY 
CASE AUTHORITY 
Guinand v. Walton. 450 P. 2d 467 (Utah 1969). 
Kellogg v. Burdick. 80 N.E. 207. 
Leclerq v. Leclerq. 155 A. 249, 74 ALR 1348. 
Sinquefield v. Valentine. 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81, 76 ALR 238. 
Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg. 245 P. 966. 
STATUTE 
§71-1-302 Utah Code Ann. 
§71-1-302(2) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-1-102 Utah Code Ann. 
§75-1-201 Utah Code Ann. 
§75-1-201(20) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-1-201(31) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-1-403 Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-105 Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-105(1) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-703(1) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-710 Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-710(1) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-710(3) Utah Code Ann. 
§75-3-711 Utah Code Ann. 
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11 
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12 
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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Denial of the Petition and Rule 60(b) U. R. C. P. Motion of the 
Personal Representative to amend or vacate the Court's prior Order of 
December 3,1985 claiming the Court lacked jurisdiction and that the order 
was based upon the Petition of a non-interested party. Did the Court have 
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter at the time of its Order, 
December 3, 1985? 
(a) The scope and jurisdiction of the District Court is set forth in 
Title 71-1-302 entitled SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, to wit: 
(2) The Court has full power to make orders, judgments and decrees 
and take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the 
matters which come before it. 
(b) The personal Representative was bound by the order of the 
Court by virtue of 75-1-403 Utah Code Ann. which provides that Orders 
binding a Personal Representative also bind persons interested in the 
undistributed assets of a decedent's estate in actions or proceedings by or 
against the estate. 
(c) Kent McLaughlin is an interested person in that he was a 
creditor of the estate within the meaning of 75-1-201 Utah Code Ann., 
having a claim against the estate of the decedent by virtue of an equity lien 
to the real property to be sold. 
(d) The Order of the Court was based on the Petition of the 
Personal representative and not upon that of Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin. 
Title 75-1 -201 (31) Utah Code Ann. defines Petition: 
"Petition means a written request to the Court for 
an order after notice." 
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Kent and Carol McLaughlin appeared at the time of hearing on the petition 
of the Personal Representative, submitted offers and bids to the Court 
which were accepted and approved thereby submitting themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the Court at the hearing held on November 6, 1985. 
(e) The Personal Representative elected to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the Court by filing his petition requesting approval of the sale of the 
home and the furnishings, being aware that there was a dispute concerning 
non-waiver of Mr. McLaughlin's remaining equity interest in the home. 
Once the Personal Representative invoked the powers of the Court under 
71-1-302(2) Utah Code Ann., jurisdiction existed and the Order of the 
Court was a proper exercise of its powers. 
(f) The Probate Code mandates that it shall be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. (See 75-1-102 
Utah Code Ann.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, Kent McLaughlin, is the former husband of decedent, Diane 
Laura McLaughlin. He and decedent were divorced by Decree of the Third 
Judicial District Court December 15, 1977. (Civil No. D 29268) Kent 
McLaughlin married his present wife, Carol McLaughlin, September 1, 
1979. 
Kent McLaughlin is the natural father and guardian of Shaun 
McLaughlin (age 14) and Dustin McLaughlin (age 10), the only issue of his 
marriage to the decedent. He is the legal custodian of Shaun and Dustin 
McLaughlin by Court Order. 
Diane Laura McLaughlin died intestate on August 2,1985 as a 
passenger on Delta Airlines flight 191, which crashed at Dallas/Ft. Worth 
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Airport. (R. 13-14; 24) She is survived by her two (2) sons, Shaun and 
Dustin McLaughlin; her former husband, Kent McLaughlin; her father, 
Eugene L. Perry; and her mother, Elnora Perry. Diane was not married at 
the time of her death and Shaun and Dustin are her sole heirs at law. 
Shortly after Diane's death, Kent McLaughlin met with her father, Mr. 
Perry. Kent McLaughlin agreed to Mr. Perry acting as Personal 
Representative of the estate, with his promise that he would consider the 
desires of Shaun and Dustin, to wit: that the home was not to be sold and 
that they would keep the furniture and other personal property of their 
mother. (R. 275) Promises were made to Shaun and Dustin by Mr. Perry 
to the effect that Shaun and Dustin could keep their mother's furniture and 
personal property, which would be stored for them. (R. 270-271) 
Commercial Security Bank was appointed Conservator for Shaun and 
Dustin by Petition filed by Mr. Perry. Kent McLaughlin did not object to 
the appointment of the Conservator. Commercial Security Bank, following 
the appointment, in turn nominated Mr. Perry to be the appointed Personal 
Representative of the estate of decedent, Diane McLaughlin. Kent 
McLaughlin, in keeping with his understanding that Mr. Perry would honor 
the desires of Shaun and Dustin, did not object to the appointment of Mr. 
Perry as Personal Representative. (R. 13-15) This understanding was 
violated by Mr. Perry in October, 1985, when he, acting as Personal 
Representative, determined to sell the home and furnishings, contrary to the 
desires of Shaun and Dustin, the sole heirs of the estate. (R. 271) 
Mr. Perry, together with the Conservator, Commercial Security Bank, . 
represented by the same attorneys, filed separate Petitions to sue Delta 
Airlines for the wrongful death of Diane McLaughlin, based upon a 
contingent fee arrangement. (R. 21-32; 342-343; see also P. 85-837) Mr. 
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Perry, the Conservator and the attorneys involved were eventually able to 
correct this duplication of efforts and fees only after the timely filing of a 
Petition to remove Mr. Perry as Personal Representative by Kent 
McLaughlin. (R. 325-321; 342-356) 
On or about October 15,1985, the Personal Representative petitioned 
the Court for an approval of the sale of the home, and in a separate 
package, the sale of the furniture which both Shaun and Dustin wished to 
keep as a remembrance of their mother. This Petition also requested the 
approval of an alleged oral waiver of Kent McLaughlin's remaining equity 
interest in the home, which interest had been awarded in the Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 35-54) The Conservator responded by waiving notice of Mr. 
Perry's Petition. (R. 60) The Hearing on the Petition was continued on 
November 6,1985 at the request of the attorneys representing the 
Conservator and the Personal Representative. This was due to Mr. Perry's 
failure to have the property appraised to determine if the proposed sale was 
for a reasonable value. 
On November 6, 1985, a hearing on Mr. Perry's Petition was held 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. Kent and Carol McLaughlin 
appeared personally at the hearing and were represented by E. H. 
Fankhauser. when the matter was called, the objection of Kent McLaughlin 
to the alleged waiver of his equitable lien was granted. (T. 3) The 
McLaughlin's then presented their offer to purchase the real property in 
question together with an offer to purchase the furnishings. (T. 3-5) The 
Court ruled, following a detailed inquiry into the facts, that the offers 
presented by the McLaughlins were higher and better than those presented 
byArnauds. (T. 5-16) The record, contrary to claims made by Mr. Perry, 
does not support the claim that the Court asked for higher and better bids 
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with regard to the home and the furnishings. (T. 13-14) The transcripts of 
the hearing contain no objections by the Personal Representative or his 
attorney, Mr. Charles Bennett, to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain 
the bids made by the McLaughlins, or to the standing of the McLaughlins. 
(T. 3-18) 
Mr. Fankhauser prepared an Order for the McLaughlins, to which the 
Personal Representative took objection. Mr. Perry, through Mr. Bennett, 
then prepared and submitted an Order which was signed by the Court on 
December 3,1985. (R. 77-81) The Order required the McLaughlins to 
complete the purchase of the home and the furnishings on or before 
December 1, 1985. (R. 80) McLaughlins completed the purchase of the 
furniture before December 1, 1985 by tendering a Cashier's Check for the 
full purchase price. (R. 267) The efforts of the McLaughlins to complete 
the purchase the home were frustrated by the Personal Representative and 
they subsequently failed to met the December 1, 1985 deadline. (R. 187; 
169-172; 262-267) 
All parties present at the November 6th hearing, together with their 
attorneys, met at the offices of Commercial Security Bank, immediately 
following the hearing. The McLaughlins once again informed Mr. Perry of 
the desires of Shaun and Dustin concerning the sale of the home and the 
furniture, that they not be sold to a third party. (T. 15; R. 262-264; 270-
271; 273-275) Mr. Leatham, representing the Conservator, admonished 
the McLaughlins to take ownership of the home and the furniture in their 
name, otherwise the Conservator would have to take possession in the 
names of Shaun and/or Dustin. 
Mr. Perry, acting pursuant to his own interests, filed a Petition for an 
Order approving the sale of other furniture and personal property of the 
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estate to himself. (R. 83-86) The Conservator, through the same attorneys 
which were representing Mr. Perry, waived notice of the hearing on this 
Petition. (R. 83-94) The Court signed an Order approving the sale of the 
Property to Mr. Perry without the Schedule attached, on December 26, 
1985. (R. 96-97) 
The McLaughlins made numerous attempts to obtain possession of the 
furniture which they had purchased on or about November 27, 1985. Mr. 
Perry in direct contravention to, and in violation of the Order of the Court, 
sold the furniture in question to the Arnauds on or about December 13, 
1985. Kent and Carol McLaughlin, in an effort to obtain possession of the 
furniture, and in order to prevent its sale to the Arnauds, sought and 
obtained an Order requiring Mr. Perry to appear and show cause why he 
should not be required to deliver the furniture to the McLaughlins. (R. 
122-123; 126-127) The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup continued the matter at 
the request of Mr. Perry. Judge Rigtrup made a finding to the effect that 
paragraph 3 of the Petition before Judge Hanson did not allege that the 
furniture was to be sold as part of the real property and that the proceedings 
conducted before Judge Hanson regarded the sale of the furniture as being 
separate from the sale of the real property. (R. 131-132) 
The Personal Representative, following service with the Order to Show 
Cause, filed a Rule 60(b) Petition on January 13, 1986, requesting an 
amendment of the Order of December 3, 1985. (R. 100-103; 109-114; 
128-130) The Personal Representative thereafter filed an amended Rule 
60(b) Petition on or about January 20, 1986. (R. 184) The Personal 
Representative's Rule 60(b) Petition and Amended Petition were argued on 
February 10, 1986 and were submitted to the Court for a decision. Judge 
Hanson delivered a Memorandum decision on or about February 25, 1986. 
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(R. 154; 156-167) The Court denied Mr. Perry's Rule 60(b) Petition and 
the Amended Petition. An Oral motion made by Mr. Perry to certify the 
matter under Rule 54(b), Utah Code of Civil Procedure, was denied 
without prejudice. (R. 190-191) Respondent disputes the Personal 
Representative's editorial characterization of the Memorandum Decision, at 
page 9 and 10 of Appellant's Brief, under the paragraph heading: "The 
Court's Memorandum Decision Denies Mr. Perry's Petition." Judge 
Hanson's Memorandum Decision speaks for itself in clear, concise and 
unambiguous language. 
Mr. Perry subsequently filed a Petition under Rule 59(a) on March 24, 
1986, requesting the Court amend its Order of March 12,1986 and instead 
hold that the Order of December 3,1985 was void for want of jurisdiction, 
and to certify the Order under Rule 54(b). (R. 203) Memorandums and 
Affidavits were subsequently filed by each of the parties. (R. 216-247; 
253-280; 283-288) The Court, following a hearing on April 7, 1986, 
denied the Rule 59(a) Petition and certified the March 12 Order under Rule 
54(b) (R. 289-297) 
The Appellant now seeks relief from the March 12,1986 Order of Judge 
Hanson. (R. 298-299) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: The Court's Order of December 3, 1985 was a proper 
exercise of its jurisdictional authority under §75-1-302 and §75-3-105 Utah 
Code Ann. 
Section 75-1-302 Utah Code Ann. provides in part that the Probate 
Court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to Estates of decedents 
and has full power to make orders. The Court has the further duty of 
supervising the conveyance of all real and personal property of the estate, 
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ensuring that all such transfers requested by the Personal Representative 
are "consistent with the best interests of the estate." §75-3-703(1) Utah 
Code Ann. The best interests of the estate has interpreted to mean that any 
conveyance "is to the greatest advantage of the estate." Stockyards Nat. 
Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg. 245 P. 966 The Court, having good 
jurisdiction proceeded to guard the best interests of the estate by not 
allowing the sale of the home and furniture to the Arnauds. 
A. The Sale of the Home and Furniture to the Arnauds was a Violation of a 
Lawful Order of the Court and a Breach of Mr. Perry's duty to protect the 
interests of the estate and its creditors. 
When the Personal Representative invoked the jurisdiction of the Court 
at the November 6, 1985 hearing, the Court was bound to scrutinize any 
and all offers made to ensure that they were in the "best interests of the 
estate", including the offers made by the Arnauds. Kent McLaughlin's 
offers, which formed a lesser encumbrance on the realty involved due to the 
deduction of his equity interest from the mortgage amount, and which 
enriched the estate by $100 on the sale of the furniture, were higher and a 
better offers, which served to both protect the assets of the estate and to 
protect the interests of Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin in keeping both the 
home and the furniture involved. Once the Court was made aware of the 
McLaughlin offers, it could no longer authorize the sale of the home or the 
furniture to the Arnaud's. Such sales would be violative of the Court's 
duty to protect the best interests of the estate. 
Furthermore, the Personal Representative was obligated under the 
current Utah Probate Code, to exercise control over title to the property in 
trust "for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate", 
irrespective of the 1983 repeal of subsections 2-4 of §75-3-710 Utah Code 
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Ann. §75-3-710(1) Utah Code Ann. The sale of the home and the 
furniture to the Arnauds was an improper use of and a violation of the trust 
placed in the Personal representative by the Utah Probate Code. The value 
of the estate was lessened thereby and further damage could result to the 
estate through the liability incurred by the Personal Representative as the 
result of litigation under §75-3-711 Utah Code Ann. 
The Order of December 3,1985 was a lawful exercise of authority by 
the Court, made in an effort to protect the interests of creditors and others, 
including Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin and their father, Kent 
McLaughlin. The Court was aware of two levels of interest existing at the 
time of the hearing. The first was the general financial interests of 
creditors, including Kent McLaughlin. It acted to preserve the financial 
integrity of the estate by rejecting the offers made by the Arnauds. In 
addition to this general interest, the sole heirs at law, Shaun and Dustin, 
wanted the home and the furniture to remain in the family for sentimental 
reasons, as is their right. The fact the Mr. Perry intended to sell to Arnauds 
is evidence of his disregard for this important interest. The Court lawfully 
ordered the sale of the home to Kent McLaughlin in order to protect this 
interest. 
C. The Court's Order. Given Pursuant to Good Jurisdiction.was not 
Deviated From in Good Faith. 
Appellant, having sought out and invoked the jurisdiction of the Court in 
this matter, having objected to the wording of the Order as originally set 
forth by Mr. Fankhauser and drew up the Order as it now reads. They 
cannot assert in good faith any ignorance of its provisions. Mr. Perry was 
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aware that his sale of the home and the furniture to the Arnauds was 
unlawful. 
SUMMARY OF POINT ONE:; 
The Court acted pursuant to good jurisdiction following the filing of Mr. 
Perry's Petition to sell the home and the furniture to the Arnauds. In 
ordering the sale of the home and furniture to Kent McLaughlin, the Court 
was exercising its "full power" to make orders. The Order to sell to Kent 
McLaughlin was a protective measure guarding the interests of the estate 
and its creditors and other interested persons, which included the interest of 
the sole heirs at law to have the home and furniture remain in the family. 
Thus the repeal of §75-3-710(3) in no way adversely affects the validity of 
the court's Order or excuses the deliberate breach of trust by Mr. Perry in 
selling to the Arnauds in violation of that Order. 
POINT TWO: Kent McLaughlin was an interested party within the scope 
and meaning of §75-1-201(20) Utah Code Ann. 
A. Kent McLaughlin's equity interest in the home qualifies him as an 
interested party. 
Kent McLaughlin was awarded an equity interest in the real property in 
question following his 1977 divorce from the decedent. This interest 
qualifies him as an interested party: m[i] interested person' includes . . . 
creditors . . . and any others having a property right in or a claim against" 
the estate of a decedent. §75-1-201(20) Utah Code Ann. (emphasis added) 
As an interested person, Kent McLaughlin was qualified to bid on the 
home pursuant to the authority given to the Court to accept bids from any 
and all interested persons. §75-3-105(1) Utah Code Ann. His bid was 
approved and the sale of the home ordered by the Court in order to protect 
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the best interests of the estate. Mr. Perry unlawfully sold the home to the 
Arnauds in total disregard of the Order of the Court. 
The Alleged Oral Transfer of Kent McLaughlin's Equity Interest Stated in 
Appellant's Brief Does Not Affect His Standing as an Interested Person 
The Statute of Frauds provides in part that all conveyances of real 
property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year and those 
made by operation of law, shall be made in writing. §25-5-1 Utah Code 
Ann. The purposes and policies underlying the Statutes requirement of a 
written instrument are set forth in Guinand v. Walton. 450 P. 2d 467 (Utah 
1969). "The purpose of the statute is that certain matters of great 
importance such as the conveyance of real estate should [be in writing] to 
protect against frauds and perjuries." (Guinand at 469) Kent McLaughlin 
was powerless by statute to orally convey or surrender his interest in the 
real property in question. Had Mr. McLaughlin attempted to orally convey 
his interest as has been alleged, such a conveyance was void ab initio and in 
no way affects adversely his standing as an interested person with respect 
to the sale of the home. 
The Court is Empowered to Determine the Meaning of "Interested Person" 
According to its Discretionary Assessment of the Nature of the Proceedings 
and the Matters Involved. 
The Court made a correct use of its discretion in determining that the 
interests of Kent McLaughlin were sufficient to qulify him as an interested 
person empowered to bid on the sale of the home and furniture. 
Any determination of whether or not a person qualifies as an interested 
person is subject to the discretion of the Court. §75-1-201(20) Utah Code 
Ann. provides for such discretionary determination by stating that the 
meaning of interested person is not fixed immutably, but "may vary from 
time to time" and authorized the Court to determine its meaning "according 
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to the particular purposes of, and the matters involved in, any proceeding." 
This grant of discretion indicates that the Legislature was sensitive to the 
needs of the estate and its wellbeing and authorized the Court to adjust the 
definition of who is an interested person according to these needs. 
The Appellant bears the heavy burden of demonstrating an abuse of 
discretion by Judge Hanson in his determination that Mr. McLaughlin was 
an interested person who's interest in the Home was sufficient to allow him 
to bid on its sale. This burden has not been met. (Laub v. South Central 
Utah Telephone Association. Inc.. 657 P. 2d 1304 (Utah, 1982) That 
Judge Hanson was occupied with concerns for the estate and parties 
interested in it was clearly demonstrated throughout the hearing. His 
decision to allow Mr. McLaughlin to bid as an interested party was founded 
upon these concerns. Had Mr. Perry honored his trust as Personal 
Representative and made his concern for the estate and those interested in it 
of paramount importance, it is doubtful that these proceedings would be 
necessary. The determinations made by Judge Hanson are well founded in 
justifyable concerns, it is the actions of Mr. Perry that are of doubious 
integrity. 
B. Kent McLaughlin is the natural father of his minor children, Shaun and 
Dustin McLaughlin who are the sole heirs at law of the Decedent's estate, 
and his appearance at the November 6, 1985 hearing was to represent the 
interests of his minor wards, who were interested persons, and was thus 
qualfied to speak and act at the hearing in their behalf. §75-1-201(20) Utah 
Code Ann. 
1- The death of one parent, survived by the other parent, qualifies the 
surviving parent as the natural guardian of surviving minor children. 
Modern case law generally holds that should a parent die, the surviving 
parent is the natural guardian of their minor children. (Sinquefield v. 
Valentine. 159 Miss 144, 132 So 81, 76 ALR 238; Kellogg v. Burdick. 80 
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N.E. 207) The guardianship attaches immediately following the death of 
the parent and is binding irrespective of any divorce decrees that had 
granted custody to the deceased parent. fLeclerq v. Leclerq. 155 A. 249, 
74 ALR 1348) Unless both parents die, there is no vacancy of the 
guardianship. fe.g.. Sinquefield. Kellogg) Although Utah has not enacted 
a statute creating natural guardianship, the virtues of such a policy, if 
adopted by this court, are substantial. The legal rights of the child are 
protected through such an arrangement, the survivng parent need take no 
legal action in order to continue the smooth functioning of the family unit 
and security and stability for the child are provided with no expense or 
delay. 
Kent McLaughlin appeared in court at the November 6,1985 hearing as 
the natural guardian of his minor children, Shaun and Dustin. The record 
give substantial support to Mr. McLaughlin's claim that the Personal 
Representative was attempting to sell the home and furniture with no regard 
for the desires of the sole heirs at law to keep the property. Shaun and 
Dustin, their legal wellbeing having been disregarded by the Personal 
Representative, were without legal guidance and protection during the 
course of the hearing. Kent McLaughlin exercised his rights as father and 
natural guardian in an attempt to protect their interests. The Order of 
December 3, 1986 served to protect the interests of Shaun and Dustin, 
through the sale of the home and the furniture to their father and guardian. 
The sale of the home by Mr. Perry was a breach of the trust that Kent 
McLaughlin, as father and guardian had placed in him. On numerous 
occasions, Mr. McLaughlin had stated to Mr. Perry that he had no 
objections to his activities as Personal Representative so long as the 
interests of Shaun and Dust hi were the basis of such activity. 
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Kent McLaughlin was qualfied to bid on the sale of the home and the 
furniture since he was the natural guardian of his minor children, whose 
interests were at stake. "Interested person" includes . . . heirs. . .ward[s], 
or protected person[s] which may be affected by the proceeding." §75-1-
201(20) Utah Code Ann. Shaun and Dustin were interested persons within 
the definition of the statute and Kent McLaughlin, acting as their guardian, 
was qualified to speak and act in their behalf, including bidding on the 
home and the furniture in order to enforce the desires of his children. His 
bid for the furniture, made on behalf of Shaun and Dustin, was a lawful 
act. §75-3-105(1) Utah Code Ann. 
SUMMARY OF POINT TWO: 
Kent McLaughlin's equity interest in the home qualified him as an 
interested person who made a lawful bid on it in order to protect that 
interest. The sale of the home to the Amauds was a unilateral decision on 
the part of the Personal Representative which disregarded Mr. 
McLaughlin's interests as they had been defined by the Court. By statute, 
the Court is empowered to determine the interests of the parties involved in 
probate proceedings and to exectute orders pursuant to their interests and in 
the best interest of the estate. Mr,, Perry was not empowered, by statute or 
otherwise, to disregard the lawful order of the Court. Had he felt that the 
Order was unlawful, then his course of action should have been to attack 
the Order and await a final determination of its validity, including appellate 
review before disregarding it and selling the home to the Arnauds. 
Because Kent McLaughlin was an interested person, the Court correctly 
accepted his bid as the higher and better offer, Ordered the sale of the home 
to him and determined not to grant the subsequent Petitions of Mr. Perry to 
vacate that Order. This exercise of discretion by Judge Hanson was 
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lawful. Appellant has failed to demonstrate grounds upon which this court 
should find an abuse of discretion. 
Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin were interested persons due to their 
status as heirs, wards and protected persons. Kent McLaughlin's bid on 
the furniture was made as the natural and sole guardian of Shaun and 
Dustin, in an effort, later nullified by the shortsighted actions of Mr. Perry, 
to protect their interests as they had been expressed to Mr. Perry on 
numerous occasions. Mr. McLaughlin had performed his part of the sale, 
and Mr. Perry's failure to comply with the terms of that sale as expressed in 
the Order, constitutes a serious breach of his duties as Personal 
Representative and made the lawful efforts of the Court to guard the best 
interests of the estate a nullity. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The trial Court had full jurisdiction to oversee the sale of the home and 
the furniture. This jurisdictional authority was coupled with a duty to 
preserve the best interests of the estate against actions or activities which 
would threaten its well being. The Order requiring the sale of the home and 
the furniture to Mr. McLaughlin was made pursuant to good jurisdiction 
and in an effort to preserve the integrity of the estate. 
Kent McLaughlin was an interested person with the right to appear at the 
hearing and defend his interests in the home. This included the right to bid 
on the sale of the home. The repeal of the section of the Utah Code 
allowing the Court to accept bids from non-interested persons in no way 
affects adversly his standing as an interested person and in no way 
impinges upon his right to appear and bid on the home. 
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Kent McLaughlin is the father and natural guardian of his minor 
children, Shaun and Dustin. His bid on the sale of the home and the 
furniture was pursuant to their interests and standing as interested parties. 
Mr. McLaughlin respectfully prays that the Court deny Appellant's 
request to vacate the lawful Order of the probate court made on December 
3, 1985. 
COMMENT ON APPELLANTS CASE AUTHORITY: 
Appellant has made substantial reliance upon Matter of Estate of 
Peterson. 802 P. 2d 801 (Utah, 1986). Petitioner is obliged to guide the 
court in determining the applicability of this case to the instant case. 
Peterson involved an attempt by a creditor (Freed Leasing, Inc., 
hereinafter "Freed") to enforce a lien it had against the Personal 
Representative ("Peterson") of an estate by obtaining a judgment against the 
estate itself, rather than against the Personal Representative. When the 
Court ruled that Freed had no standing as an interested person it correctly 
determined that Freed, although they may have had a valid claim against the 
Personal Representative, had no claim upon the estate in law or equity and 
was not an interested person within the meaning of the statute. 
In the instant case, the facts address a lien had by Mr. McLaughlin 
against the estate itself. He is therefore a creditor of the estate and clearly 
falls within the meaning of the statute. Peterson is clearly distinguishable 
from the instant case, is of questionable utility for our present purposes and 
sheds no light on the issue of Kent McLaughlin's standing as a interested 
person. 
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DATED THIS 2nd DAY OF MARCH, 1987. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed to Charles M. Bennett of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 
Attorneys for Appellant, Suite 800, Kennecott Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84133, on this jP day of March, 1987. 
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